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ABSTRACT 
DECENT PEOPLES, POLITICAL LEGITMACY, AND INFORMED CONSENT 
 
by 
 
Jonathan Grandits 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2013 
Under the Supervision of Professor Blain Neufeld 
 
 
In The Law of Peoples, John Rawls attempts to work out principles of justice for the 
foreign policy of a reasonably just liberal people. One of his primary goals is to establish 
the minimum requirements necessary for a people to be an equal member (or a 'members 
in good standing') within a Society of Peoples (SoP). While Rawls believes that all well-
ordered liberal peoples meet these requirements, he also believes that there are non-
liberal peoples that are capable of doing so as well. He thus imagines the possibility of a 
non-liberal, well-ordered people. He calls such peoples Decent Hierarchical Societies 
(DHS). For Rawls, then, a fully just SoP need not constituted exclusively by liberal 
peoples. 
 
In this paper I argue against the inclusion of DHSs within the SoP on social epistemic 
grounds. More specifically, I argue that because DHSs do not secure for their members 
certain liberal rights—namely, the freedom of speech (and, consequently, freedom of the 
press)—such members will not have available to them the necessary means to give their 
legitimate (or free) support. This will result in DHSs violating a necessary condition of 
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'well-orderedness,' namely, that members freely support the basic institutions of their 
society, or what I call the political legitimacy condition. As such, DHSs should not be 
regarded as members in good standing within the SoP. 
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In The Law of Peoples (LP), John Rawls attempts to work out principles of justice 
for the foreign policy of a reasonably just liberal people.1 One of his primary goals is to 
establish the minimum requirements necessary for a people to be an equal member (or a 
'members in good standing') within a Society of Peoples (SoP). While Rawls believes that 
all well-ordered liberal peoples meet these requirements, he also believes that there are 
non-liberal peoples that are capable of doing so as well. He thus imagines the possibility 
of a non-liberal, well-ordered people. He calls such peoples Decent Hierarchical Societies 
(DHS). For Rawls, then, a fully just SoP need not be constituted exclusively by liberal 
peoples.  
According to Rawls's account of domestic justice, all well-ordered liberal 
societies not only respect basic human rights but also liberal democratic rights. These 
latter rights include the freedom of speech, freedom of thought and conscience, freedom 
of association, and the right to equal participation in the political processes of one’s 
society (e.g. equal voting rights; equal opportunity to run for the highest offices of one’s 
society). However, in his international account of justice, Rawls narrows the set of rights 
that must be respected by all societies within the SoP to basic human rights. Because 
liberal democratic rights are not basic human rights according to Rawls, DHSs need not 
grant their members liberal democratic rights in order to be well-ordered. As a 
consequence, DHSs need not grant their members liberal democratic rights to be 
members in good standing within the SoP. 
In this paper I argue against the inclusion of DHSs within the SoP on social 
epistemic grounds. More specifically, I argue that because DHSs do not secure for their 
                                                 
1
     John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 10. 
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members certain liberal rights—namely, freedom of speech (and, consequently, freedom 
of the press)—such members will not have available to them the necessary means to give 
their legitimate support. This will result in DHSs violating a necessary condition of 'well-
orderedness,' what I call the political legitimacy condition. As such, DHSs should not be 
regarded as members in good standing within the SoP. 
This paper will proceed as follows. In section I, I explicate what I take to be three 
necessary conditions of a well-ordered society according to Rawls. In section II, I focus 
on one of these conditions—the political legitimacy condition—and explain why Rawls 
thinks DHSs satisfy this condition. This will require arguing that Rawls has a conception 
of political legitimacy in LP, despite his apparent silence over such matters. In section III, 
I clarify this notion of legitimacy and argue that the members of society must be capable 
of becoming adequately informed if we are to regard their support as legitimate. In 
section IV, I introduce the subject of social epistemology and the notion of social 
epistemic dependency. In section V, I argue that because DHSs do not respect liberal 
rights, their social epistemic environment will not provide their members with the means 
necessary for becoming adequately informed. It follows from this that DHSs are not 
legitimate and, as a result, should not be included within a fully just SoP. However, this 
raises questions about how liberal societies should treat DHSs. To what degree should 
liberal societies tolerate DHSs? If DHSs are not included within the SoP, does this entitle 
liberal societies to coerce them into accepting liberal principles of justice? I address these 
questions in section VI. Finally, in section VII I argue that, given the highly non-ideal 
conditions of our world, there may often be good practical reasons for including DHSs in 
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the SoP. However, this is consistent with the view that an ideal, fully just SoP would 
consist of liberal societies and liberal societies only.    
 
I: On Well-Ordered Societies 
According to Rawls, a society must meet the following conditions for it to be a 
well-ordered society:  
1) The human rights condition 
2) The non-aggressive condition 
3) The political legitimacy condition2 
 
As this paper only concerns the third condition, the first two conditions only need 
brief mention here. The human rights condition states that for a society to be well-ordered 
it must protect certain basic human rights. Rawls includes as basic rights the right to 
subsistence and security; freedom from genocide, slavery, and forced occupation; and the 
right to own personal property. Rawls also includes minimal formal equality as a basic 
right, namely, that 'like cases be treated similarly.' Without each of these rights secured, 
Rawls thinks that social cooperation will be impossible.3 
                                                 
2
     Conditions (1) and (2) parallel Rawls's two criteria of decent peoples listed in §8.2 of LP. However, 
close readers of Rawls will notice two things. First, (3) is not explicitly mentioned in 8.2 (or elsewhere). I 
will address this later. Second, this list does not correspond to Rawls's definition of a well-ordered society 
in Justice As Fairness: A Restatment (JaF). According to his account there, decent peoples would not be 
well-ordered as they do not have, inter alia, a basic structure that is effectively regulated by a political 
conception of justice (cf. pgs. 8-9). However, in LP, Rawls considers all members within the SoP, 
including decent peoples, well-ordered (cf. pgs. 4, 63). Rawls has clearly relaxed his conditions for well-
orderedness in LP. This is perhaps best explained by the different domains that justice is being applied to in 
each book: JaF is a domestic account of justice and LP is an international account of justice. Rawls is clear 
throughout his writings that the same principles of justice do not apply to all domains (e.g. a well-ordered 
family need not be regulated by the difference principle). In any event, the reader should note that I am 
working with the conditions as he sets them out in LP. For more on this, cf. Blain Neufeld, "Liberal 
Foreign Policy and the Ideal of Fair Social Cooperation," forthcoming in Journal of Social Philosophy 
(2013). 
 
3
     Rawls, LP, 65. 
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The non-aggressive condition states that well-ordered societies respect the social 
and political orders of other peoples, viewing them as free and independent, and must 
only promote their rational ends through diplomacy, trade, and other peaceful means of 
cooperation.4 This condition does not preclude the possibility of military intervention. 
Rawls thinks that well-ordered societies have a duty to prevent human rights violations, 
and assuming that less aggressive means of intervention are not available (e.g. economic 
sanctions), military intervention is justified. But such intervention is not aggressive: its 
purpose is to protect the rights of others and not to further the rational ends of the 
intervening society.5 
The third condition of a well-ordered society—and the one most relevant for this 
paper—states that a society can only be well-ordered if its basic institutions are freely 
supported by its rational and decent members.6 The concern here is one of legitimacy. If, 
as Rawls believes, governments have a monopoly on political power and such power is 
always coercive, then justification is needed to legitimize the use of this power.7 This 
justification is satisfied, Rawls thinks, if the rational and decent members of a society 
freely support—or give their consent to—the basic institutions of their society and the 
conception of justice that regulates them. In so doing, the members of society thereby 
consent to the coercive political power of the state. 
                                                 
4
     Ibid, 64. 
 
5
     See Rawls, LP, 37-38, 80, 94. 
 
6
     'Decent' members that comprise a DHS can be contrasted with the 'reasonable' members that comprise 
well-ordered liberal societies. According to Rawls, decency is a weaker normative idea than the idea of 
reasonableness. See Ibid, 67. Reasonable persons are characterized by, among other things, "their 
willingness to offer fair terms of social cooperation among equals." Ibid, 87. While decent persons do not 
offer fair terms of social cooperation to others, they do offer terms that are decent, i.e. terms that respect 
everyone's basic human rights and the right of everyone to take part in the political processes of society. 
For more on the difference between decency and reasonableness, cf. Ibid, 87-88.  
 
7
     Rawls, JaF, 90. 
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According to Rawls, most non-liberal societies will fail to meet one or more of 
the three conditions. For instance, those societies he calls 'outlaw states' fail to meet, 
among others, the second condition. Societies burdened by unfavorable conditions 
('burdened societies') fail to meet, among others, the first condition. Moreover, those 
societies he calls 'benevolent absolutisms' meet the first two conditions, but because they 
do not involve their members in the political process—the ruler or ruling group decides 
all of the political and legal decisions without consulting the members of society—they 
fail the third condition.8 On the other hand, according to Rawls, DHSs satisfy all three 
conditions: they respect basic human rights, they are non-aggressive in their foreign 
policy, and they can be regarded as politically legitimate. 
One final note. Rawls does not think that satisfying the political legitimacy 
condition (or, for that matter, the first two conditions) is sufficient for being fully just: the 
conditions for legitimacy are not identical to (and are, in fact, more easily satisfied than) 
the conditions for justice. A fully just society, according to Rawls, is a well-ordered 
liberal society that is, among other things, effectively regulated by the difference 
principle.9 Thus, Rawls thinks that while all liberal and decent societies satisfy the 
political legitimacy condition (as I specify this condition), all decent societies and many 
liberal societies will nonetheless fail to satisfy the conditions for justice.10 
 
II: Decent Peoples and Political Legitimacy 
                                                 
8
     Rawls, LP, 63. 
 
9
     Or "something like the difference principle." See Rawls, JaF, 49. 
 
10
     For more on the difference between justice and legitimacy, see John Rawls, Political Liberalism: 
Expanded Edition, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 427-28. 
  
6
 
 
Rawls is surprisingly silent on political legitimacy in LP. Unlike the first two 
conditions, he never makes it explicit that the third condition is necessary for a society to 
be well-ordered. It would be a mistake, however, to think this means he is not concerned 
with it. The purpose of this section is, therefore, twofold: to show that Rawls does, in 
fact, think political legitimacy is a necessary condition for a society to be well-ordered 
and to explain why Rawls thinks DHSs satisfy this condition. To show this, I will 
introduce two essential features of a DHS: what Rawls calls a 'decent consultation 
hierarchy' and a 'common good conception of justice.' 
DHSs involve their members in the political process through what Rawls calls a 
'decent consultation hierarchy.'11 In a decent consultation hierarchy, each individual 
person is represented at the political level by the associations, corporations, and other 
groups of which they are members. This means that members of DHSs are not given 
voting rights characteristic of liberal democratic societies—namely, one vote per person. 
Nonetheless, Rawls thinks that a decent consultation hierarchy allows an opportunity for 
different voices to be heard.12  
Moreover, a decent consultation hierarchy is responsive to its members' right of 
dissent. Rawls states, "Judges and other officials must be willing to address [the] 
objections [of political dissenters]. They cannot refuse to listen, charging that the 
dissenters are incompetent and unable to understand, for then we would have not a decent 
consultation hierarchy, but a paternalistic regime."13 Rawls thus believes that a decent 
                                                 
11
     Rawls, LP, 71. 
 
12
     Ibid, 72. 
 
13
     Ibid. 
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consultation hierarchy—given its associationist structure and given that it respects 
political dissenters—provides the members of a DHS with adequate involvement in the 
political processes of their society. 
 By requiring that DHSs involve their members in the political process, Rawls 
provides us with the most convincing reason for thinking he is concerned with the 
satisfaction of the political legitimacy condition. Consider, again, benevolent 
absolutisms. Rawls explicitly states that such societies are not well-ordered precisely 
because they "deny their members a meaningful role in making political decisions."14  A 
decent consultation hierarchy, on the other hand, requires that each person in society 
belong to a group, that each group be consulted about political and legal matters, and that 
each group be represented by a legal body that is constituted, in part, by members who 
know and share the interests of the group. This, Rawls says, "ensures that the 
fundamental interests of all groups are consulted and taken into account." 15 Clearly 
Rawls is concerned with legitimacy here.  
Furthermore, Rawls's concern with the right of political dissent is revealing. Not 
only does he insist that the judges and other officials of a DHS must listen to and address 
political dissenters, he also tells us that if such dissenters are not satisfied with the judges' 
response, they can renew their protest given that they explain why they are dissatisfied. 
Judges are then obligated to give them a further and fuller reply. This suggests, once 
                                                 
14
     Ibid, 63. 
 
15
     Ibid, 77. 
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again, that Rawls is concerned with a society that will, over time, be freely supported by 
its rational and decent members.16 
The second distinctive feature of a DHS is that their basic structure is regulated by 
a 'common good conception of justice.'17  Such a conception of justice is grounded in a 
particular comprehensive doctrine—some religious or philosophical doctrine such as 
Islam or utilitarianism—that determines what the common good is. For example, 
consider Rawls's imaginary Islamic DHS, Kazanistan. Kazanistan's basic structure and 
system of law does not uphold the separation of church and state.18 While minority 
religions are tolerated in Kazanistan, Islam is the favored religion. Not only are the 
highest political offices exclusively open to Muslims but all fundamental political and 
legal decisions are justified by Islamic principles. As Rawls states, political and legal 
decisions "should be made according to a conception of the special priorities of 
Kazanistan. Among these special priorities is to establish a decent and rational Muslim 
people respecting the religious minorities within it."19 Thus, political and legal matters in 
Kazanistan will be decided by how the Muslim rulers interpret the common good as 
understood by the principles and teachings of Islam. 
Rawls's insistence that the conception of justice of a DHS be a common good 
conception that "takes into account what it sees as the fundamental interests of everyone 
                                                 
16
     Ibid, 72 
. 
17
     A common good conception of justice can be contrasted with a political conception of justice that 
regulates the basic structure of well-ordered liberal societies. Political conceptions are freestanding with 
respect to the various reasonable comprehensive doctrines within society: they neither endorse nor reject 
the reasonable religious or philosophical views of the members of society. Political and legal decisions are 
thus made, not by appeal to the common good as understood by a particular comprehensive doctrine, but by 
an appeal to public reason. 
 
18
     Ibid, 75. 
 
19
     Ibid, 77, emphasis mine. 
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in society" and that secures for everyone basic human rights, further suggests that he is 
concerned with the satisfaction of the third condition.20 After all, it is difficult to see how 
the basic structure could be freely supported by its members if their fundamental interests 
and basic rights and not secured.   
We may reasonably suppose, then, that Rawls thinks that a common good 
conception of justice, along with a decent consultation hierarchy, is sufficient for 
regarding DHSs as legitimately supported by its members. We may summarize this in the 
following way. A society can be regarded as politically legitimate if and only if its basic 
structure: 
(a) involves the members of society in the political process to a sufficient degree,  
 
and  
 
(b) is effectively regulated by a conception of justice that is at least decent.21 22 
 
III: Clarifying Legitimacy 
I do not think that (a) and (b) are sufficient for regarding DHSs as being freely 
supported by their members. To see why, it will be useful to clarify exactly what 
legitimacy is and, therefore, requires. In order to do this, I will distinguish between two 
different types of support (or consent): the fact of support and legitimate support. The 
                                                 
20
     Ibid, 67. 
 
21
     Notice here that these two conditions do not satisfy the 'liberal principle of legitimacy' set out by 
Rawls in his domestic account of justice. That principle requires, inter alia, that the basic structure is 
regulated by a political conception of justice. So, assuming that I am correct in supposing that Rawls does 
have a conception of political legitimacy in LP, the conditions here are weaker than they are for well-
ordered liberal societies. 
 
22
      There is a reason for saying 'at least' here. Rawls thinks that the conception of justice that regulates the 
basic structure of liberal societies is not decent but reasonable. As noted in footnote 5, decency is a weaker 
normative idea than reasonableness. Thus, while a common good conception of justice satisfies (b), any 
reasonable political conception of justice will do so as well.  
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distinction between these two types of support can be illustrated by cases of epistemic 
oppression.  
First, consider the section from The Republic wherein Plato suggests that, for the 
sake of justice and stability, rulers ought to tell a 'noble lie' by convincing the other 
members of society that one's social position is not a matter of contingent circumstance 
but is a result of one's nature as determined by God.23 In cases like these, one might find 
that the members of society voice their support in favor of the basic institutions of their 
society—satisfying the fact of support—and yet that support seems illegitimate. It seems 
illegitimate because it is based on a lie and, as such, is not adequately informed. Notice, 
however, that what seems morally problematic about this case is not merely the fact that 
the members' support is not adequately informed, but that they have been prevented from 
becoming adequately informed. After all, the noble lie would not be very effective if it 
was easily found out, and thus we find Plato advocating the widespread use of censorship 
throughout the kallipolis. 
Second, consider a non-political example of epistemic oppression. Suppose that a 
father teaches his child that persons of a particular skin color are morally and 
intellectually inferior to those of other skin colors. Further suppose that, as the child 
develops, the father not only continues to reinforce this belief but that he also censors, as 
best he can, information that would put this belief into question. Suppose that the father is 
successful in these efforts. Finally, suppose that we now ask the child (who is now a 
young adult) whether or not he supports, say, a policy that would base voting rights on 
skin color. Even if we suppose that the child says 'yes' in non-coercive circumstances—
                                                 
23
     Plato, The Republic, Book III, 414b-415c. 
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i.e. no one has threatened him to answer in a certain way, his father is now deceased, and 
so on—his answer seems illegitimate. Again, whatever else we might say about this case, 
the child's answer seems illegitimate because he has been prevented from becoming 
adequately informed.   
I take it, then, that the fact of support is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for legitimate support. A further condition is needed. This further condition must address 
the worry about the possibility of epistemic oppression because it is difficult to see how 
one's support could be legitimate if one is so oppressed. As Margaret Jenkins states, there 
is always a question about "how much weight should be given to individuals’ perception 
of themselves in public life (certainly people can be oppressed even when they do not 
believe they are).”24  In other words, it is a mistake to think that a society is legitimately 
supported by its members just in case those members voluntarily voice their support in 
non-coercive circumstances.  
It is my contention, then, that a person's factual support of the basic institutions of 
society is legitimate if and only if they have not been prevented from becoming 
adequately informed. Or, as I will put it, their support is legitimate if and only if they are 
capable of becoming adequately informed, i.e. capable of giving their informed support 
(consent). Thus, in addition to (a) and (b), I add that for a society to be politically 
legitimate, the basic structure must: 
(c) provide its members with the means necessary to become adequately 
informed. 
 
                                                 
24
     Margaret Jenkins, “Political Liberalism and Toleration in Foreign Policy,” Journal of Social 
Philosophy 41 (2010): 129. 
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There are three things to note here. First, (c) is a weaker condition than one that 
requires that members' support be actually adequately informed. In other words, (c) is 
satisfied just in case the members of society are capable of becoming adequately 
informed, not if they are, in fact, adequately informed. There are three reasons for 
favoring the weaker condition over the stronger one. First, the weaker condition seems 
sufficient to capture the intuitions we have about the above cases. As noted earlier, the 
problem with the above cases of epistemic oppression is not merely that the oppressed 
persons are not adequately informed, but that they have been prevented from becoming—
or have not been provided with the means necessary to become—adequately informed. 
Second, one need not make a condition stronger than it has to be. While it may turn out 
that the stronger condition should be adopted, my argument will not depend it. Adopting 
the stronger condition will also lead to the conclusion that I seek. And third, there is the 
worry that the stronger condition could undermine the legitimacy of even liberal 
societies. A society in which every citizen (or, at least, every rational and reasonable 
citizen) is actually adequately informed about all of the relevant subjects may not be 
feasible. This is speculatory, of course, but in order to avoid this possible objection, I will 
adopt the weaker condition. But again, my argument will not hinge on which condition 
(strong or weak) that one adopts.  
Second, many kinds of information may be necessary to satisfy (c). I will list two 
of them. First, having the capacity to become adequately informed requires that one has 
access to the relevant facts. One of the problems with the above cases of epistemic 
oppression is that the oppressed persons are prevented from accessing certain facts about 
humans. Of course, these are not the only relevant facts that one must have access to. I 
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need not specify all of the relevant facts here, but certainly general scientific and 
historical facts will be relevant; so will the facts about one's political and legal 
institutions, the conception of justice that regulates them, and the comprehensive doctrine 
that grounds that conception (assuming that society has such a comprehensive doctrine).  
Having the capacity to become adequately informed also requires that one has 
access to a sufficient diversity of alternative theories (viewpoints, accounts, ideas, 
comprehensive doctrines, etc). Facts are not always (if ever) self-reporting: they need to 
be interpreted and evaluated, placed within larger theories, and are sometimes themselves 
theory-dependent. Thus, facts by themselves do not always help us decide between 
alternative theories. For instance, the members of Kazanistan may have access to all of 
the facts about their comprehensive doctrine—e.g. what the Koran teaches, historical 
facts about the development of Islam, and so on—but these facts by themselves will not 
inform them about whether or not that doctrine is plausible or if the common good 
conception of justice that regulates their basic structure is preferable to a political 
conception. If people are severely limited in what theories they have access to, allowing 
them access to the relevant facts will not be enough for them to become adequately 
informed.  
Lastly, assuming that I am right that (c) is a necessary condition of political 
legitimacy, we have achieved a significant result. It is now left open to anyone to propose 
ways in which DHSs satisfy or violate (c). I will argue that DHSs will violate (c) on 
social epistemic grounds. More specifically, I will argue that because DHSs do not 
respect liberal rights, their social epistemic environment will be unable to satisfy (c). 
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Before I argue that, however, it will be helpful to briefly discuss social epistemology 
more generally.  
 
IV: On Our Social Epistemic Dependency 
Instead of providing a definition of social epistemology, it will be more useful to 
explain (what I take to be) three rather uncontroversial facts of social epistemology. The 
first fact of social epistemology is that we are epistemically dependent upon our social 
environment for all of our beliefs. Our moral and prudential beliefs, scientific and 
historical beliefs, our beliefs about the basic institutions of our society and the conception 
of justice that governs them, are all dependent upon the sorts of information that are made 
available to us throughout the course of our lives. Sometimes such information is taught 
to us by our parents and peers, other times it is by engaging with the general media 
(understood in the broadest sense so as to include public news organizations—the press—
and information centers like the internet, public libraries, and public schools). After Allen 
Buchanan, I will call this our 'social epistemic dependency.'25 
The second fact of social epistemology is that our social epistemic dependency is 
not something we can voluntarily opt out of. There are three reasons for this. First, many 
of our beliefs are formed in our early childhood before we have the cognitive capacity to 
voluntarily opt out. Second, even when we do acquire such capacities, it seems 
implausible to suppose that we can avoid engaging with our social epistemic 
environment. Much of the information we are subject to on a day-to-day basis is 
involuntary and unavoidable. Third, we are epistemically dependent upon what Buchanan 
                                                 
25
     Allen Buchanan, "Political Liberalism and Social Epistemology," Philosophy & Public Affairs 32 
(2004): 95-130. 
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calls an 'epistemic division of labor'.26 Such a division of labor involves epistemic 
deference to those far outside our immediate social circle, namely, the various experts 
within society. So, to the extent that we can avoid engaging with our social epistemic 
environment, it still remains the case that one person cannot form many reliable beliefs—
or know very much—on his or her own.27  
The third fact of social epistemology is that our social epistemic environment is 
largely dependent upon the basic structure of society. Rawls has famously argued that the 
basic structure, more so than anything else, determines our life-prospects.28 It does this, 
in part, by securing and protecting the rights that members of society have. Furthermore, 
it seems reasonable to suppose that the rights that we have are intimately related to our 
epistemic-prospects. For instance, those who do not have their basic rights respected will 
not be provided with the means necessary to become adequately informed. Certainly 
those who are starving or extremely impoverished will not have very good epistemic-
prospects. This is just to say that the basic structure—which secures rights—is integral to 
our social epistemic environment, which determines the facts and theories that we have 
access to. 
Given the first two facts of social epistemology, we can now say that having 
access to the relevant facts and a sufficient diversity of alternative theories requires that 
one live within a society with a social epistemic environment of the right sort. As the 
                                                 
26
     Ibid, 103. 
 
27
     Ibid, 98. 
 
28
     Rawls states that the basic structure affects "citizens' aims, aspirations, and character, as well as...their 
opportunities and their ability to take advantage of them" and that such affects are "pervasive and present 
from the beginning of life." John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), 10. It seems reasonable to suppose here that "opportunities" can be understood to 
refer to, among other things, our epistemic opportunities.  
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third fact of social epistemology suggests, however, having a social epistemic 
environment of the right sort requires having a basic structure of the right sort. The 
question of importance now is this: will a society with a basic structure that does not 
accord its members liberal rights have a social epistemic environment that satisfies (c)? I 
don't think it will. To show this, I will argue that there are three features that a society 
must have for its social epistemic environment to satisfy (c): it must (1) allow its 
members to freely exercise their rational capacities, (2) properly motivate its members to 
express their beliefs, and (3) not prevent its members from expressing those beliefs. In 
short, a society must be reason-enabling, properly motivating, and sufficiently open. 
Societies that respect liberal rights will have all three features. On the other hand, DHS 
will only, at most, have the first two but not the third.   
 
V: The Argument From Social Epistemology 
Societies that are reason-enabling are ones that allow their members to freely 
exercise their rational capacities. That is, they allow the members of society to 'think for 
themselves' –  to freely analyze the beliefs and claims of the other members of society 
while forming beliefs of their own. If members of society are not allowed to do this—if 
they are, for instance, starving or severely mentally manipulated—then the beliefs and 
claims that they do have access to will have no real value. Moreover, persons who are not 
allowed to freely exercise their rational capacities will themselves be poor epistemic 
contributors to the social epistemic environment. It is with the free exercise of our 
rational capacities, then, that we find the bases for the sort of diversity that is required for 
members of society to become adequately informed. 
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I take it that the sort of measures that are required to prevent persons from 
exercising their rational capacities are likely not consistent with protecting their basic 
human rights. Therefore, because DHSs do protect such rights, I will assume that DHSs 
will allow their members to freely exercise their rational capacities and move on to the 
second feature.  
Societies that are properly motivating are ones that provide the members of 
society with the motivation to express their beliefs and, in particular, their epistemic 
dissent. We can define 'epistemic dissent' here as those beliefs that conflict with the status 
quo, where the status quo can be understood to refer to any beliefs that are either widely 
accepted throughout society or widely accepted by an epistemically authoritative sub-set 
of society (i.e. experts).29 Given our social epistemic dependency, if the members of 
society do not have the proper motivation to express their epistemic dissent, then there is 
little reason to think they will have access to the relevant facts and a sufficient diversity 
of alternative theories. Furthermore, it is worth noting here that the openness of the social 
epistemic environment will not have real value if the members of society are not properly 
motivated to express their beliefs. Censorship from an external source (like the 
government) would not be required if people are already unwilling to express their beliefs 
(if they are already, we might say, internally or self-censored).  
Part of Rawls's conception of a well-ordered liberal society is that persons who 
are raised in them come to acquire a sense of justice.30 In a liberal society, part of this 
                                                 
29
     We must not forget that our social epistemic dependency includes deference to epistemic authorities. If 
such authorities are not properly motivated to express epistemic dissent, then there is good reason to think 
that the other members of society will not have access to the relevant facts and a sufficient diversity of 
alternative theories.   
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     Rawls, JaF, 29.      
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sense of justice will include coming to value the liberal rights that are accorded to oneself 
and to others.31 Thus, we would expect that members raised in liberal societies will come 
to value the expression of their own beliefs (and the beliefs of others) and eventually 
come to consider this expression as one of their fundamental rights. Members of liberal 
societies, we might say, feel entitled to express their beliefs and will not listen to those 
who tell them otherwise. Liberal societies thus foster a social epistemic environment that, 
among other things, encourages the members of society to not only express their beliefs 
but to not fear expressing their epistemic dissent. Well-ordered liberal societies thus 
produce social epistemic environments that are properly motivating.  
Given that persons raised in well-ordered liberal societies are properly motivated 
to express their beliefs, including their epistemic dissent, we may wonder if this will also 
hold for persons raised in DHSs. Persons raised in DHSs will, we may suppose, acquire a 
sense of justice of their own, but this sense of justice, so it seems to me, will be limited to 
the conception of justice that they are familiar with, namely, a common good conception 
of justice. Their sense of justice will thus include acquiring the belief that basic human 
rights are fundamental, but this belief will not extend to liberal rights. Furthermore, recall 
that the common good conceptions of justice of DHSs presuppose the truth of one 
particular comprehensive doctrine, and that the rulers of a DHS (at least in Rawls's 
Kazanistan), along with the majority of the members of society, all endorse that doctrine. 
Given this strong bias in favor of one particular comprehensive doctrine throughout 
society, and given that members are not raised to accept the expression of their beliefs as 
a fundamental right, there is a serious worry that the members of DHSs will not be 
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     Rawls tells us that citizens have a sense of justice that gradually develops and "after the age of reason 
[is] exercised in many kinds of judgments of justice ranging over all kinds of subjects, from the basic 
structure of society to the particular actions and character of people in everyday life." Ibid.  
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properly motivated to express their epistemic dissent. Perhaps this will be due to the fear 
of being chastised by their rulers and fellow compatriots, or because they value social 
cohesion over individualism, or because they simply don't place much value on 
distinguishing themselves by expressing their unorthodox beliefs.   
Despite these worries, however, there are good reasons for thinking that DHSs 
will be properly motivating. Recall that one of the rights accorded to the members of a 
DHS is the right to political dissent. Further recall that this right requires that judges and 
other officials respect those who choose to dissent by giving them a full and 
conscientious reply. It seems to me that this right alone (assuming basic human rights are 
secured) may be enough to properly motivate the members of a DHS to express their 
epistemic dissent. After all, part of expressing one's political dissent will include 
expressing one's various dissenting beliefs. And if the members of a DHS are raised with 
this right and can thus be expected to come to view this right as fundamental, it seems 
unlikely that they will come to believe that expressing their epistemic dissent is not 
valuable or that it is something to fear.  
I don't claim to have settled this issue. Certainly more could be said. But because I 
take the following argument to be much more decisive, I will assume, for the sake of the 
argument, that persons raised in DHSs will have the proper motivation to express their 
epistemic dissent. There is still one more way that DHSs can fail to have a social 
epistemic environment conducive to satisfying (c): they can fail to be sufficiently open.    
Societies that are sufficiently open allow their members to freely express their 
beliefs and to freely access the diversity of beliefs of the other members of society. Given 
our social epistemic dependency, societies that are not sufficiently open will prevent their 
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members from having access to the relevant facts and a sufficient diversity of beliefs held 
by the other members of society. Thus, societies that are sufficiently open do not permit 
the obvious forms of epistemic oppression, like censorship. In liberal societies, openness 
is guaranteed by the fact that they accord their members the freedom of speech (and, 
consequently, freedom of the press). 
The members of a DHS, however, do not have the freedom of speech. It follows 
straightforwardly from this fact that censorship is permissible within a DHS. 
Nevertheless, claiming that censorship is permissible within a DHS does not entail that 
the rulers will, in fact, censor. After all, it seems possible that there could be a DHS that, 
for whatever reason, never resorts to censorship, even though it could in principle. Hence, 
one might argue that there is no a priori reason to think that DHSs will fail to be 
sufficiently open. I don't think this is a plausible suggestion, however, due to an inherent 
tension within DHSs that will require that they resort to censorship if they are to remain 
stable over time.  
Rawls has famously argued that any society that is sufficiently free will be 
characterized by 'reasonable pluralism' or a plurality of comprehensive doctrines. Rawls 
thinks that reasonable pluralism will inevitably result in such societies due to 'the burdens 
of judgment.'32 Moreover, Rawls argues that the only way to prevent reasonable 
pluralism from arising within a society is through epistemic oppression (or other forms of 
oppression that result in epistemic oppression). He calls this 'the fact of oppression.'33  
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     The burdens of judgment are, roughly, the difficulties involved in assessing various kinds of evidence 
i.e., deciding what evidence is relevant, deciding how much weight should be given to that evidence, and 
other such normative epistemic problems. See JaF, 35-36, for a fuller discussion of the connection between 
reasonable pluralism and the burdens of judgment.  
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Thus, we must ask: will DHSs be characterized by reasonable pluralism? As we 
have seen, there are good reasons for thinking that they will be. After all, if DHSs are 
reason-enabling, properly motivating, and sufficiently open (which, I have suggested, 
seems possible in principle), it seems to follow that they would have to be. Also, Rawls 
explicitly mentions that Kazanistan contains religious minorities (and is thus a pluralist 
society).34 In any event, for our purposes we have to assume that DHSs will be 
characterized by reasonable pluralism because if they are not, then—given the fact of 
oppression—this can only be because they are epistemically oppressed. But if they are 
epistemically oppressed, then (c) is violated. So let us suppose that DHSs are 
characterized by reasonable pluralism.  
This raises the problem of stability: how can a society that is characterized by 
reasonable pluralism and whose basic structure endorses one particular comprehensive 
doctrine maintain itself over time? In other words, if the members of DHSs hold various 
incompatible comprehensive doctrines—and the basic structure of a DHS is grounded in 
one particular comprehensive doctrine—then it seems implausible to suppose that such 
members will factually support the basic structure. Many of the various public policies 
that are justified by the common good conception of justice and the reigning 
comprehensive doctrine will not be accepted by them. Moreover, even if judges and other 
officials respectfully address the objections of political dissenters, this process will be 
severely limited due to the fact that the fundamental grounds that such officials appeal to 
will be rejected by the dissenters. 
The worry here is that one of two scenarios will result: either a DHS will, over 
time, become unstable as a result of their members not factually supporting the basic 
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structure or it will remain stable at the expense of reasonable pluralism. To maintain their 
society, then, the rulers of a DHS will need to undermine one of the three features. 
Although undermining any of the three features will require epistemic oppression and 
thus be a violation of (c) (i.e. that members be provided with the means necessary to 
become adequately informed), we should note that only undermining (3) (the sufficiently 
open requirement) is consistent with the basic structure of a DHS. To undermine (1) (the 
reason-enabling requirement) would require that DHSs violate the basic human rights of 
their members (or so I have assumed). And to undermine (2) (the properly motivating 
requirement) would seem to require that they at least violate their members' right to 
political dissent. However, because DHSs do not accord their members liberal rights, it is 
open to the rulers of a DHS to resort to censorship in order to prevent reasonable 
pluralism from arising. Doing so, however, will mean that DHSs will not be sufficiently 
open and thus will not have a social epistemic environment that satisfies (c). The 
violation of (c), however, entails the violation of the political legitimacy condition of a 
well-ordered society. Thus, if DHSs resort to censorship—which it seems like they must 
if they are to remain stable over time—they fail to satisfy the political legitimacy 
condition, and as a result, are not well-ordered. As such, they should not be recognized as 
members in good standing within a fully just Society of Peoples. 
  
VI: Toleration and Coercion 
If DHSs are not recognized as members in good standing within a fully just SoP, 
what should the foreign policy of a liberal society be toward them? To answer this 
question, it will be helpful to introduce Rawls's conception of toleration. According to 
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Rawls, any society in the SoP is to be tolerated by the other members of the SoP, where 
toleration here is understood in two ways. First, to tolerate a society is to recognize it as 
immune from coercion—e.g., military, economic, and diplomatic sanctions. Second, to 
tolerate a society is to recognize it as an equal participating member in the SoP with 
"certain rights and obligations" where these rights and obligations are specified by the 
Law of Peoples.35 For lack of a better term, let us call toleration with these two 
components 'Rawlsian toleration.' We can say, then, that any society within the SoP is to 
be Rawlsian tolerated by the other members of the SoP whereas any other society is not. 
If DHSs are not to be included within the SoP—as I have argued—then it follows 
that they are not to be Rawlsian tolerated by liberal societies. However, if they are not 
Rawlsian tolerated by liberal societies, then it seems to follow that they will always be 
"properly subject to some form of sanction."36 Rawls finds this objectionable, however. 
For one, the use of sanctions on DHSs violates the liberal commitment to tolerate other 
"acceptable ways...of ordering society."37 Moreover, the use of sanctions will deny DHSs 
their due respect. Rawls states, "If liberal peoples require that all societies be liberal and 
subject those that are not to politically enforced sanctions, then decent nonliberal peoples 
will be denied a due measure of respect by liberal peoples...Denying respect to other 
peoples and their members requires strong reasons to be justified."38 How are we to 
understand Rawls's objections here? Here is one way me might understand them.  
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Alyssa Bernstein distinguishes between two different perspectives from which 
one can judge the legitimacy of a society: as a citizen from the inside or as a foreigner 
from the outside. Bernstein calls this 'internal' and 'external' judgments of legitimacy, 
respectively.39 Thus, for example, it would be possible for a liberal society (or the 
members of a liberal society) to reject the legitimacy of a DHS even though the members 
of that DHS might believe that their own government is legitimate. Indeed, this is what I 
assumed when I claimed that it is possible for the members of a DHS to give their 
voluntary support even if, from the perspective of a liberal society, that support is 
unwarranted (e.g. for social epistemic reasons). Thus, we might take Rawls's objections 
above as saying that if all of the rational and decent members of a DHS believe that their 
government is legitimate, then there should be a presumption in favor of toleration and 
respect toward that society. To coerce a society that is voluntarily supported by its 
rational and decent members requires strong reasons to be justified.  
Furthermore, even if the rational and decent members of a DHS came to doubt or 
reject the legitimacy of their society, this does not, by itself, seem to justify the 
enforcement of sanctions by liberal societies. To see why, consider a case in which the 
legitimacy of a liberal society was doubted or rejected by its own rational and reasonable 
members. We would not think that such a rejection, by itself, justified foreigners from 
enforcing sanctions on the liberal (or once-liberal) society. As Bernstein says, "Even if a 
citizen of the USA were to...call into question the legitimacy of its government, she 
would not therefore be committed to the view that its sovereignty need not be respected 
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and David Reidy (eds.), Rawls's Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia (Blackwell Publishing, 2006): 288. 
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by foreign governments or that it had lost its right of non-intervention."40 If a liberal 
society loses its claim to legitimacy, there are often built-in mechanisms within the 
structure of that society for returning it to a state of legitimacy (e.g. democratic elections, 
term limits for statesmen, courts of appeal). And we may reasonably suspect, I think, that 
the citizens of that society will prefer this method over foreign interference. After all, one 
of the purposes of such built-in mechanisms is, presumably, so that foreign interference is 
not required. Thus, assuming that such mechanisms are in place, foreign interference 
would not respect the will of the members of that society to regulate themselves. To 
interfere with such a society would, again, not give them their due respect as a sovereign 
nation.  
Like liberal societies, decent societies also have built-in mechanisms within their 
basic structure for returning it to a state of internal legitimacy. For instance, although not 
procedurally democratic, DHSs hold elections for the highest offices of society. They 
also allow for political protests and judicial appeals. Thus, as in the case of liberal 
societies, even if the members of a DHS came to doubt or reject the legitimacy of their 
own basic structure, it does not follow that foreign interference is justified. Such 
interference would not respect the will of the members of that society to regulate 
themselves. As Rawls states,  
All societies undergo gradual changes, and this is no less true of decent societies 
than of others. Liberal peoples should not suppose that decent societies are unable 
to reform themselves in their own way...Leaving aside the deep question of 
whether some forms of culture and ways of life are good in themselves (as I 
believe they are), it is surely, ceteris paribus, a good for individuals and 
associations to be attached to their particular culture and to take part in its 
common public and civic life.41  
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Of course, if it should become apparent that the once-liberal society or the DHS is not 
capable of returning itself to a state of internal legitimacy, then, perhaps, some form of 
coercion from foreigners is justified (especially if the situation becomes so dire that basic 
human rights of its members are threatened). However, the point here is, as it was before, 
that there should be a presumption in favor of toleration and respect toward those 
societies that are legitimate (or nearly-so) from the perspective of its own members and 
that coercion of those societies requires strong reasons to be justified.  
And what, we ask, can these strong reasons be? In some cases—say, in the case of 
some outlaw states or burden societies—those strong reasons will be available: if 
anything is a sufficient reason to enforce coercive sanctions, the violation of basic human 
rights is. But such reasons will not be present in the case of a DHS. As we have already 
seen, even if DHSs are neither fully just (according to Rawls)42 nor fully legitimate 
(according to my argument in the previous section), they do respect basic human rights, 
allow their members some involvement in the political processes of society, and allow 
political dissent. In other words, they are decent. However, if we conclude that they are 
not legitimate from a liberal point-of-view and are, therefore, not members in good 
standing—and if we commit ourselves to the view that societies outside the SoP are not 
to be Rawlsian tolerated—we seem to be led to the conclusion that DHSs will always be 
subject to some form of sanction by liberal societies. But, again, this conclusion runs up 
against Rawls's objections above. 
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The response to this problem is to note that Rawls has set up a false dilemma. In 
his arguments above, Rawls seems to imply that either a society is within the SoP or it is 
the proper subject of coercive sanctions. We can state this another way using Rawls's 
conception of toleration: either a society is in the SoP and therefore Rawlsian tolerated—
i.e. not subject to coercive sanctions and an equal participating member with certain 
rights and obligations—or it is not in the SoP and therefore not Rawlsian tolerated—i.e. 
the proper subject of coercive sanctions and not an equal participating member with 
certain rights and obligations. However, Rawlsian toleration and the lack thereof does not 
seem to exhaust the logical possibilities for how a society might treat another society. I 
want to suggest a second form of toleration.  
 Often, when we speak of one group tolerating another group (or one person 
tolerating another person), we don't have Rawlsian toleration in mind. That is, we don't 
think that the group doing the tolerating has to accept the other group as their equal (as 
having an equal claim to, say, rationality or to having the same rights). Rather, what it 
means for one group to tolerate another is that the first group "puts up with" the second 
group or, to use another idiom, the first group "lets them [the second group] be." Let us 
call this hands-off toleration. More clearly, hands-off toleration suggests a lack of 
interaction between the two groups: one group hands-off tolerates another group just in 
case the first group neither cooperates with nor coerces the second group.  
For example, suppose that a group of distinct Christian denominations share a 
single place of worship. Even though each denomination adheres to different Christian 
doctrines, they decide to form a Society of Christians and thereby Rawlsian tolerate each 
other. Not only do they not attempt to coerce each other (by, say, putting pressure on 
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each other to convert to their own respective Christian denomination) but they also view 
each other as equal members with the same rights and obligations to the place of worship 
and to each other. Further suppose that there is a new Muslim organization in town that 
wants to share this place of worship with the Christian denominations. Suppose, also, that 
the state owns this place of worship and has declared that the Muslim organization has 
the right to use it. The Society of Christians could respond in various ways. They could 
decide to Rawlsian tolerate the Muslim organization and thereby welcome it into their 
society with all of the rights and obligations that come along with it. Or they could refuse 
to Rawlsian tolerate them by both not inviting them into their society and by attempting 
to convert them. Or they could hands-off tolerate them by not inviting them into their 
society but also by not attempting to convert them. If they chose this option, they would 
neither cooperate with nor coerce the Muslim organization.  
Hands-off toleration thus suggests a possible middle ground between Rawlsian 
toleration and the lack thereof. Thus, it is at least prima facie possible for a liberal society 
to neither accept a DHS as an equal participating member with certain rights and 
obligations within a SoP nor subject it to coercive sanctions. Liberal societies can hands-
off tolerate DHSs without Rawlsian tolerating them. 
On this view, the foreign policy of a liberal society toward a DHS may not differ 
very much from the foreign policy of a liberal society toward another Rawlsian type of 
society: benevolent absolutisms. Rawls states that benevolent absolutisms are not well-
ordered because they do not involve their members in the political processes of society. 
As argued earlier, this suggests that Rawls does not think benevolent absolutisms are 
legitimate and that it is for this reason that they are excluded from the SoP. But Rawls 
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never suggests that benevolent absolutisms should be subject to coercive sanctions by the 
societies that comprise the SoP. In fact, he seems to imply the opposite when he claims 
that not only do liberal and decent societies have a right to self-defense, but so do 
benevolent absolutisms. "Any society that is nonaggressive and that honors human rights 
has the right of self-defense" even if "its level of spiritual life and culture may not be high 
in our eyes."43 Presumably, then, even benevolent absolutisms have a right to sovereignty 
and should only be coerced should they fail to satisfy either of these conditions.44 Yet, as 
Alyssa Bernstein notes, benevolent absolutisms "are not entitled to full membership in 
good standing in the Society of Peoples. What exactly did Rawls mean by this? What 
should he have meant? I suggest we should take it to mean that such states are not 
entitled to full respectful toleration and cooperation from other states."45 Thus, my 
suggestion is that liberal societies can treat DHSs in roughly the same way Rawls and 
Bernstein suggest that liberal societies treat benevolent absolutisms. They can tolerate 
and respect them (i.e. hands-off tolerate them) without fully tolerating and fully 
respecting them (i.e. Rawlsian tolerate them).46 Doing the former avoids Rawls's 
objections above and doing the latter (i.e. refusing to Rawlsian tolerate them) allows the 
liberal to maintain his or her belief that only liberal societies are legitimate and thus 
entitled to full membership in good standing in the SoP.  
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On my view, then, because neither benevolent absolutisms nor DHSs are 
legitimate, neither should be accepted into an idealized SoP. An idealized SoP would 
consist of liberal societies and liberal societies only. But this need not entail that liberal 
societies should coerce or otherwise attempt to impose liberal principles of justice on 
those societies. Such coercion can be reserved for those societies that violate or threaten 
to violate the basic human rights of their own members or the members of other societies.  
 
VII: Some Non-Ideal Theory 
Jon Mandle holds that many interpreters of Rawls have erroneously understood 
Rawls's inclusion of DHSs in the SoP as being grounded in purely practical reasons. 
Mandle states, "The most common reading of The Law of Peoples...treats the toleration of 
decent hierarchical societies as a form of modus vivendi. Practical necessity may require 
that liberal societies refrain from imposing liberal principles of justice on other societies, 
but there is no deeper reason for toleration."47 Mandle thinks this interpretation is wrong. 
Instead, Mandle argues that Rawls thinks that liberal societies have deeper reasons (i.e. 
theoretical or principled reasons) for refraining from coercing DHSs, namely, the 
principle of toleration and respect. I do not wish to enter into this interpretive debate. 
However, one thing I hope to have shown in the previous section is that even if liberals 
have principled reasons for refraining from coercing DHSs, the liberal commitment to 
such principled reasons can be satisfied even if DHSs are not included in the SoP. A 
liberal can show toleration and respect toward DHSs (or other non-liberal societies) 
                                                 
47
     Jon Mandle, "Tolerating injustice," in Gillian Brock and Harry Brighouse (eds.), The Political 
Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 222. 
 
  
31
 
 
without also committing him or herself to the view that those societies are entitled to the 
same level of toleration and respect as their own or other liberal societies. 
 It may turn out, however, that there are good practical reasons for including DHSs 
in the SoP when we come face-to-face with "the highly nonideal conditions of our 
world."48 Whatever the proper interpretation of Rawls is, some of his arguments for 
including DHSs in the SoP do sound purely practical in nature. Consider the following 
argument, 
If liberal constitutional democracy is, in fact, superior to other forms of society, as 
I believe it to be, a liberal people should have confidence in their convictions and 
suppose that a decent society, when offered due respect by liberal peoples, may be 
more likely, over time, to recognize the advantages of liberal institutions and take 
steps toward becoming more liberal on its own.49 
 
The argument here doesn't suggest that liberal societies should respect DHSs because 
there is something inherently respectable about their form of governance. Rather, the 
argument is that liberal societies should respect DHSs because doing so may lead to 
preferable consequences, namely, the liberalization of DHSs over time. Indeed, there may 
be cases where the inclusion of a DHS in the SoP would create better relations between 
the DHS and liberal societies and that these relations will be sufficient for reforming 
DHSs in the direction of liberalism. We might even suppose that including DHSs in the 
SoP is the only non-coercive method for liberalizing them in the long run. Thus, one 
might argue that—ideal theory notwithstanding—there are good practical reasons for 
including DHSs in the SoP. 
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This argument is entirely consistent with the view I have proposed. This becomes 
more clear once we realize what nonideal theory is. According to Rawls, nonideal theory 
is about taking the necessary practical steps toward eventually realizing one's ideal. In 
this case, that ideal is bringing all societies into the SoP. With the ideal in place, one 
"looks for policies and courses of action that are morally permissible and politically 
possible as well as likely to be effective."50 As such, until ideal theory is settled, 
"nonideal theory lacks an objective, an aim, by reference to which its queries can be 
answered."51 Thus, we can say that the aim or ideal is a SoP comprised of liberal societies 
and liberal societies only. To achieve this ideal, however, it may be necessary to adopt 
certain policies or courses of action that violate this ideal. This may look like a 
compromising of one's principles, but this will not be a compromise if one's practical 
reasons are subservient to one's principled reasons. In the argument above, DHSs are 
included in the SoP, but only for the sake of realizing the ideal. One can thus consistently 
believe both that there are good practical reasons for including DHSs in the SoP and that 
an ideal SoP would not include them. 
 
VIII: Conclusion 
In this paper I argued that Rawls has a conception of political legitimacy in LP 
and that societies that fail to satisfy the political legitimacy condition are not well-ordered 
and are not, therefore, members in good standing within the SoP. I then argued that there 
are two conditions for satisfying the political legitimacy condition that can be extracted 
from LP: societies must have a basic structure that (a) involves the members of society in 
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the political process to a sufficient degree and (b) is effectively regulated by a conception 
of justice that is at least decent. Next, I argued that these two condition were not 
sufficient because they did not take into account the possibility of epistemic oppression 
and the importance of providing the members of society with the means necessary to 
become adequately informed (c). I then argued that because DHSs do not accord their 
members liberal rights—in particular, the freedom of speech—they will not have a social 
epistemic environment that satisfies (c). If DHSs are to remain stable over time, they will 
need to resort to epistemic oppression, namely, censorship.  
The upshot of this paper is that liberal societies and liberal societies only should 
be recognized as members in good standing within a fully just Society of Peoples. It does 
not follow from this, however, that liberal societies must coerce DHSs into accepting 
liberal principles of justice. Liberal societies can tolerate and respect DHSs in the same 
way they tolerate and respect benevolent absolutisms: they can hands-off tolerate them by 
neither cooperating with nor coercing them. Ultimately, the hope is that non-coercive 
measures can be employed that will, over time, encourage DHSs and other non-liberal 
societies to reform their basic institutions in the direction of liberalism and thus allow 
them to become members in good standing within a fully just Society of Well-Ordered 
Peoples. 
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